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1. Introduction 
This paper attempts to describe the impact of informational imperfections 
in capital markets on the level and nature of unemployment. Since this task 
is a complicated one, two basic points should be kept in mind throughout 
the subsequent discussion. 
First, most existing unemployment models take the existence of exogenous 
shocks to the marginal product of labor as a point of departure. In 
traditionally Keynesian models, these are ‘price’ shocks to the nominal 
marginal product of labor arising either from monetary or demand dis- 
turbances.’ In other models they are accepted without comment or explana- 
tion.* However, given the many shortcomings of the fixed price models3 and 
the many equilibrating forces that ought to smooth out demand fluctua- 
tions,4 some explanation for cyclical variations in the marginal product of 
labor is an essential part of any complete explanation of cyclical unemploy- 
ment. Informational imperfections (chiefly in capital markets) provide a set of 
explanations for the origins, nature and apparent magnitudes of these shocks. 
And, since these explanations are closely related to information based 
‘The most familiar form of these are ‘animal spirit’ related shifts in the marginal efficiency of 
investment. But, with fixed nominal wages, any change in demand or the money supply will do 
as well. See Solow and Stiglitz (1968), Barrow and Grossman (1967) or Malinvaud (1977). 
%ee, for examples, Baily (1977) and Grossman, Hart and Maskin (1983). 
3While prices and wages are fixed in nominal terms may make sense in a stable price 
environment it is less clear that this behavior makes sense at relatively high rates of inflation. 
Fixed infra-marginal prices make more sense than fixed marginal prices and marginal price and 
labor costs are the relevant factors in output and employment decision. Observed variations in 
output and employment seem to be greatest in sectors (e.g., investment goods, construction, etc.) 
where prices are most flexible. 
4Even with tixed prices, variations in marginal costs should serve to smooth out production 
and investment over the business cycle. In fact, production varies more than consumption and 
investment varies far more than either consumption or production. 
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explanations of the several categories of unemployment, they represent a 
natural starting point for the discussion, 
Second unemployment is a multidimensional phenomenon involving 
several significant distinctions. There is to begin with an important difference 
between steady continuing ‘unemployment’ of the kind that seems to be 
increasingly characteristic of recent European labor markets and cyclical 
variations in unemployment. The latter has been the focus of traditional 
concern with the ‘unemployment’ problem. However, the former has been an 
economic phenomena of long standing and great significance. In developing 
economies, it has been associated with underemployment in agriculture as 
workers wait their turns for industrial jobs.’ In developed economies, it 
involves underemployment in ‘secondary’ sectors of the economy as workers 
queue up for ‘primary’ sector jobs. Both kinds of unemployment can be 
traced to informational imperfections, but the models involved, or at least 
the questions asked of the models, are necessarily quite different. 
The next important distinction concerns differences in the nature of 
unemployment in the primary as opposed to secondary sectors of a 
developed economy. Primary sector jobs typically involve substantial job- 
related training, large potential variation in individual job performance and 
hence a demand for relatively high-quality workers, long-term career re- 
lationships between workers and firms and relatively high wages. Secondary 
sector jobs in contrast are associated with little training, high turnover and 
relatively low wages. Given these differences, which are presumably rooted in 
the technologies of the jobs in question, the determinants of both levels and 
variations in unemployment in the two sectors are likely to be very different. 
For example, training and acquisition costs are likely to be a much more 
important aspect of employment decisions in the primary sector than in the 
secondary sector. Moreover, in practice, unemployment variations appear to 
be different in the two sectors.’ Thus, although informational imperfections 
are capable of providing explanations for unemployment in both sectors, the 
models and factors involved will naturally differ between sectors. 
In looking at cyclical unemployment, a distinction must be maintained 
between temporary lay-offs of workers, having a high probability of returning 
to their initial employers, and unemployment among workers - both new 
entrants and those who have been permanently displaced from their most 
recent jobs - who must strike entirely new wage bargains with new 
employers. Both phenomena require explanation (e.g., why do lay-offs not 
take temporary jobs with other firms? Why do the permanently displaced 
%ee Stiglitz (1974). 
6For example, in the United States in the recessions of 1953-54, 1960-61, 1970-71 and 1975- 
76, unemployment rates for married heads of households increased by an average of 112 percent 
(i.e., they slightly more than doubled) compared to an increase of only 35 percent for teenage 
workers and 53 percent for non-white workers. 
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not receive and accept new, low wage offers?) and both can be explained by 
informational imperfections. However, as in the other cases discussed above, 
the different circumstances require slightly different theoretical approaches. 
Finally, reductions (and increases) in the demand for labor can take on 
two forms: an increase in the number of workers employed or in the hours 
worked. A theory of unemployment must explain not only the form which 
unemployment takes, but also why the incidence seems to vary so greatly 
across groups within the population. 
2. Explanation of variations in the demand for labor 
One central function of capital markets is to distribute the risks associated 
with any particular enterprise among a large number of highly diversified 
investors. The most familiar vehicle for doing this is the sale of common 
stock. However, as in the case of most other insurance markets (health, life, 
etc.), informational imperfections (e.g., moral hazard, adverse selection) will 
interfere with the operation of these financial insurance mechanisms.’ For 
example, if a company’s management with superior ‘inside’ information 
about the company’s likely future prospects is willing to sell common stock 
to relatively less well-informed ‘outside’ investors at the current market price, 
then one obvious inference is that this market price does not undervalue and 
probably overvalues the company. As a result, financial markets should (and 
do) react to stock issue announcements by lowering the common stock prices 
of the companies in question. This, in turn, will inhibit the issue of equity 
and company managements will be forced to seek other means of insuring 
against the risks associated with their operations.8 
Accumulation of equity over time is one means of accommodating these 
risks in the longer run. However, in the short run, restrictions in the level of 
company operations may be the only way of doing so. In the absence of 
complete futures markets,’ any output decision, involving as it does invest- 
ments in both working and fixed capital before output is sold, is inherently a 
risky investment decision. Consequently changes in the economy which either 
increase the risks associated with a given level of output or deplete the stock 
‘See, for example, Arrow (1970), Wilson (1977), Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) on insurance 
markets; Greenwald (1979) Stiglitz (1976) on labor markets; Jaffee and Russell (1976) Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981) and Ross (1977) on financial markets, and Akerlof (1970) for a general 
discussion of the adverse selection issue. 
‘For formal models of this phenomenon see Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss (1984), Majluf and 
Myers (1984) and. in a slightly different spirit, Leland and Pyle (1977). In fact, equity issue 
announcements are accompanied by significant declines in stock prices of the issuing company 
[see Asquith and Mullins (1983)] and this is presumably related to the observation that 
internally generated funds are by far the predominant source of equity for most firms [see 
Taggart ( 1983)]. 
‘The non-existence of many futures markets may also arise from imperfect information 
concerning the quality and reliability of delivery on all but the simplest contracts. 
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of firm equity capital will be accompanied by a reduction in the level of 
output and investment. If firms tend to hold real assets and nominal 
liabilities (i.e., fixed nominal debt contracts), then ‘negative’ money supply or 
demand shifts will reduce the real equity levels of firms and, in a near 
Keynesian way, reduce output and investment. Increased uncertainty about 
factor prices (e.g., ‘oil shocks’), relative price variations (associated, for 
example, with more rapid inflation) or the direction of public policy will also 
reduce output. And, government interventions (e.g., in labor markets) which 
reduce the flexibility of firms responses to changing market conditions will 
have a similar effect.” 
From a labor market prospective these increases in risk, relative to equity 
levels, increase the ‘risk’ cost associated with any increase in output and 
hence reduce the ‘effective’ or ‘risk adjusted’ marginal product of labor. Thus, 
without relying on any artificial rigidities in prices, informational imperfec- 
tions in capital markets can give rise to potentially large fluctuations in the 
‘effective’ marginal product of labor in response to changing conditions that 
in an economy with perfect markets would be absorbed with little or no 
impact on overall economic activity. Moreover an asymmetric distribution of 
information between borrowers and lenders may create credit rationing 
constraints that reinforce these basic effects (especially in response to 
monetary policy shifts) both as borrowers anticipate the possibility of having 
credit rationed in the future and as current credit constraints, by limiting 
working capital investments, effectively reduce the marginal product of 
labor. ’ * 
3. Lay-offs 
In the United States, at least, lay-offs from which the majority of 
employees return to their original employers are one of the major sources of 
cyclical unemployment. In the context of long-term employment relation- 
ships, variations in the ‘risk’ associated with variations in a firm’s equity level 
may give rise to circumstances under which these lay-offs are an appropriate 
response to changing capital market conditions. 
Assume for simplicity that the utility of a firm’s decision-makers (whether 
owner-entrepreneurs or hired managers) is a function of end of period equity. 
Looking forward from the beginning of the period (when decisions are 
made), end-of-period equity is a random variable, 
(1) 
“For a formal general equilibrium macroeconomic model of these phenomena see Greenwald 
and Stiglitz (1986). 
“See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). 
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PI is the uncertain end-of-period 
sold, 
f;. 
is the level of labor input, 
is a production function of the 
price at which the firm’s output will be 
usual sort, 
W, is the wage paid to workers, and 
a,_ 1 is the beginning of period equity that the firm inherits from period t 
- 1. 
With perfect capital markets, we would have to add new equity sales to the 
right-hand side of eq. (1). However, as argued above, informational imperfec- 
tions in capital markets will limit these sales and for simplicity we will 
assume that such equity sales are zero. 12*13 Thus, eq. (1) implicitly embodies 
the informational imperfections in the capital market. 
We will assume formally that in making decisions at the beginning of 
period t, a firm’s decision makers 
max EC44)1, 
where the utility function u is characterized by decreasing absolute risk 
aversion. In order to capture the constraints imposed by the existence of 
long-term labor contracts we will assume that the firm has an existing labor 
force at the beginning of period t,<, which is tied to the firm by the value of 
firm specific human capital on the one hand. and the imformational and 
other costs of changing jobs on the other hand. Whatever wages these 
workers were implicitly promised in either formal or informal labor contracts 
at the time they were hired, the appropriate marginal cost of employing them 
once these contracts have been agreed to is their marginal disutility of work. 
We will assume that this disutility, w,,, is independent of the current marginal 
product of labor; being dependent on the lifetime income embodied in their 
long-term employment relationship (which depends, in turn, on current 
wages only to a limited extent).14 
The first-order condition determining the optimal level of employment by 
“A model having firms’ managers being averse to the risk of bankruptcy but otherwise risk 
neutral produces results which are essentially similar to the generalized risk aversion assumed 
here. See Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986) which includes a justification (to the extent it is 
necessary) for having utility depend upon end of period equity. 
“Dividends can be viewed as negative equity issues. Standard signalling arguments explain 
why firms may be reluctant to adjust dividends in the face of changes in economic circum- 
stances, and why accordingly the dividend rates may, in the short run, be taken as fixed. Our 
model can be extended to include the endogenous determination of the dividend level; this 
would complicate the analysis without changing the basic conclusions. 
lAThis is essentially the argument presented by Baily (1977), reinforced at critical points by 
the impact of informational imperfections. 
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a firm facing a wage w, is, 
E[f&~(~,f’-w,)]=O. (2) 
Rearrangement of terms and use of the fact EC@. P,] = E[ii;]Efi,] + 
cov[zi~,jTJ yields the result that 
f’(l,)( 1 + cov [z-q. p”,]) = w,, (3) 
where, by choosing suitable normalizations and units, E[u”,] = E[p”,] = 1. On 
the left-hand side of eq. (3), the covariance of price levels and marginal 
utilities is negative as long as u is characterized by aversion to risk in some 
degree. Thus, the impact of capital market imperfections is in general to 
reduce the effective marginal product of labor and consequently employment. 
Moreover, after a negative demand shock (or monetary disturbance) which 
impairs the equity base of a firm, a,_ 1 will be reduced and, if u is 
characterized by decreasing absolute risk aversion, the negative covariance 
term will increase in magnitude. If at the same time policy or other 
uncertainties increase the variance of the future price distribution, this effect 
will be reinforced and it may be true that 
fyi)( 1 + c~vpi;. @,I) < wo. (4) 
Under these circumstances, a firm offering long-term contracts will find it 
optimal to lay-off workers. The temporary nature of these lay-offs, which 
would ensure that the workers involved do not seek employment elsewhere, rests 
on the possibility that the firm will ultimately restore its equity level through 
the accumulation of retained earnings over time. As its equity base increases 
the ‘risk’ of increased output will decline, the effective marginal product of 
labor will rise and laid-off workers will be called back.r5 
There are several possible senses in which these temporary lay-offs 
represent involuntary unemployment. Most familiarly, but perhaps least 
importantly, workers who look only at the average wages implied by their 
long-term employment relationships would be willing to work at that average 
wage during the period they are laid off. They may not see that the average 
wage is calculated to smooth out temporary variations in the marginal 
product of labor and is not the appropriate standard for assessing incre- 
mental employment opportunities. A second more significant sense in which 
these temporary lay-offs are ‘involuntary’ is that they represent a Pareto 
inefficiency. With an appropriate mechanism for spreading the risks as- 
“Note that in this analysis, we have assumed complete flexibility in the (shadow) wage paid 
workers in the long-term contract. 
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sociated with increased output and investment (or for circumventing credit 
rationing constraints), both firms and workers could profit from the employ- 
ment of laid-off workers. If firms offered (and workers were willing to accept) 
equity shares in future output in lieu of current wages, then lay-offs could, in 
theory, be avoided. However, the firms willing to do this are likely to be 
those whose future equity values are low relative to their observable 
characteristics. And workers, just like outside equity investors, ought to 
avoid such offers. Thus, informational failures are as likely to interfere with 
employment contracts that distribute risk as they are with explicit financial 
market arrangements. 
There remains the problem of why laid-off workers do not accept interim 
employment with other firms. If the lay-offs are recognizably temporary, then 
training considerations may militate against temporary employment in 
alternative primary jobs since alternative employers may not be able to 
recoup hiring and training costs in the time available. At the same time, 
employment in similar jobs to those from which workers have been laid off 
may not be available since ‘shocks’ which deplete the equity stock of one 
firm in an industry are likely to affect other firms in a similar way.” Finally, 
informational imperfections in the labor market may make it costly for 
workers to accept temporary jobs. First, acceptance of an alternative job 
(especially a low-paying secondary sector job) may be taken as evidence that 
the worker himself has doubts about his abilities and future prospects with 
his original employer. If workers are better informed about their own 
abilities than the labor market at large, this negative ‘signal’ may reduce 
future earnings. Second, if temporary employers observe a worker’s ability 
and are willing to ‘allow’ him to return to his original employers when 
recalled from being laid off, this may in itself constitute a negative signal 
about the worker’s ability. .4nd, if at some future time, the worker seeks to 
leave his original employer this negative signal may reduce the value of the 
alternative jobs availab!e.” 
4. Cyclical variations in hiring 
In practice, many lay-offs do not lead to re-employment and durations of 
unemployment appear to increase significantly in recessionary times. Wage 
levels in markets for unemployed workers without any rehiring expectations 
from their most recent employers do not, therefore, appear to adjust quickly 
enough to clear those markets. 
“Moreover, if there are search costs, the fact that the unemployment is viewed to be 
temporary militates against workers expending resources to find a suitable job. 
“Indeed since workers’ abilities may change stochastically over time, the secondary firm’s 
willingness to let the employee go may be a negative signal to the original employer, leading 
directly to lower wages. 
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The quandry can be put in a slightly different way. Assume capital markets 
were perfect. Real interest rates have, historically, been low and varied little. 
A firm contemplating the investment of hiring a new worker asks what is the 
optimal time to hire him. The value of a hire at time 7: viewed as of time 0, is 
SC T) 
V(7)=eerT f [b(t)- e-r@-T)&, 
T 
where b(t) is the value of the marginal product of the worker at time t, w(t) is 
the wage, and S(T) is the termination date of a worker hired at time 7: 
Differentiating with respect to 7; we obtain 
V’=rV’-emrT[b(T)-w(T)]+ g [b(S)-w(S)]emrS. ( > 
If V>O, and the period of employment is relatively long, it is clear that at 
the point where V is maximized, b< w; but typically, workers are hired only 
after the firm has first resorted to using overtime, i.e., b= w( 1 +x) where x is 
the overtime premium. We thus obtain a puzzle on the timing of hiring, 
similar to that encountered for the timing of investment (including, in 
particular, investment in inventories).” 
Capital market imperfections can however account for this variability in 
employment, when the jobs in question are primary sector jobs which 
involve substantial training costs and potential long-term relationships 
between employers and workers. Assume as before that firms maximize a 
function, U, of their end of period equity position. Assume, in addition, that 
an existing stock of trained workers represents the only element of each 
firm’s capital stock. Then the value of a firm’s equity at the end of period t is 
where a, represents the beginning of period net liquid assets of the firm, y, is 
the present value of current and committed future expenditures on the 
existing labor force and 6, is a certainty equivalent at the end of period t of 
the uncertain future net value from that time forward of the labor supplied 
by a firm’s existing labor force. This last quantity is uncertain looking 
forward from the beginning of period t. Some price and productivity 
uncertainties will be resolved during the course of period t and their 
“If there is a substantial period of on-the-job training b(t) may be less than w(t). However, in 
that case a similar contradiction arises in comparing U’ at the start of a recession when hiring 
stops (and u’<O) and u’ at the peak of the recession when hiring recommences (i.e., v’=O) and 
the firm is paying overtime. 
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resolution is reflected in the distribution of i&. The remaining uncertainties 
looking forward from the end of period t are subsumed in the process of 
taking the certainty equivalent. 
The first-order condition governing the hiring of an additional worker at 
the beginning of period t is that 
E[C( - g+g)]=o, 
which, using the appropriate normalization E[ii’] = 1, becomes 
~+!s]+cov[Q. t]. f 
For simplicity we will assume that both the training costs borne by firms 
and the wages that they implicitly undertake to pay take the form of fixed 
payments promises at the time a worker is employed and that these have the 
same status as debt to the decision makers of the firm.” 
If yt comprises total wages, then 
dy, -lf z-i=0 Wt + isj + ht, 
where w*+~ is the wage payment promised in period t+ i, ~5~ is an adjusted 
discount factor encompassing the effects of both the real rate of interest and 
the probability that a worker quits before period i (i.e., di= siSi where Fi is a 
discount factor of the normal sort and si is the probability that a worker 
remains with the firm through period t +i) and h, is the out-of-pocket cost of 
hiring and training a worker. 
Ignoring endogenous variations in the probability of continued employ- 
ment, the term dzJ/dl, is the end of period t certainly equivalent of 
‘% practice, such lixed commitments make up only part of future wages with the remaining 
part dependent on the future productivity of workers. This could be easily accommodated within 
the framework outlined above by having y, represent only the ftxed commitment portion of 
wages and t7, be net of the contingent portion of wages. The important constraint in what 
follows is that the mix of fixed to contingent labor costs not be freely variable. The 
informational argument in support of this kind of constraint is similar to that supporting the no 
equity constraint. Firms that deviate from common practice by requiring that workers pay for 
hiring and training costs and by offering wages that are heavily weighted toward contingent 
payments (essentially equity in the tirm) are disproportionately likely to be weak firms or firms 
who are prone not to fuliil contingent promises. In either case workers are presumably likely to 
avoid such firms. 
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where pt+i is the future level of prices, f’(?;+i) is the future marginal product of 
labor and, assuming firms and workers have the same discount rates, 6,+i is 
the adjusted discount factor defined above. Assuming that u is characterized 
by decreasing absolute risk aversion, decreases in the initial liquid equity 
of firms (i.e., a,_,) and increases in uncertainty concerning future prices and 
marginal productivities will reduce the value of the certainty equivalents that 
make up di?,/dl,, reducing E(dv”,/dl,). In addition as a,_ 1 falls in response to 
negative demand or monetary shocks in period t - 1, the magnitude of the 
cov[u”‘.dCJdl,], which is negative, will increase. For both reasons, therefore, 
the right-hand side of eq. (5) will decline in a recession. The right-hand side 
of eq. (5) evaluated at a firm’s existing level of employment represents the 
value of the wage contract that the firm will offer when it first begins 
expanding its labor force. 
As firms accumulate equity over time, the right-hand side of eq. (5) will 
rise and 
If this gap is sufficiently large (because in the depths of a recession firms are 
sufficiently risk averse) so that, ignoring end effects (i.e., assuming workers 
are long lived relative to the length of a typical recession) 
dy,+, ---->(l +r*) 2, 
d&+ 1 f 
where rt is an appropriate real interest rate for workers, then it is rational for 
workers to delay taking a long-term job until economic conditions improve. 
There are, in effect, no offers that firms would be willing to make in the 
depths of a recession that workers would be willing to accept. 
The resulting ‘unemployment is involuntary in the sense that, absent 
informational imperfections, there is a Pareto improving bargain that could 
be struck between workers and firms. It consists, as in the lay-off case 
discussed above, of workers agreeing to accept contingent equity-like wage 
offers and absorb a greater share of the risks associated with higher output. 
But since the firms likely to offer these contracts (e.g., Eastern Airlines) are 
just the firms from whom workers do not want to accept them, such 
arrangements are difficult to make.20 
*‘Two final remarks ought to be made about this kind of unemployment. First, in contrast to 
many models of cyclical unemployment, it arises precisely because workers recognize that they 
are in a recession, not because they are unable to distinguish between local and economy wide 
conditions. Second, the reason workers do not accept jobs and quit for new ones when 
conditions improve must depend on the informational cost (stigma) attached to such behavior 
discussed above on p. 000. If this were not the case, then such behavior would itself deter hiring 
by tirms since ai would now be small, reducing dC,/dl, and wages but not h,. 
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5. Effkiency wage models 
The models we have discussed explain fluctuations in the demand curve 
for labor. They also explain why even with perfectly flexible wages, there may 
be lay-offs: at the wages which firms would be willing to keep their 
employees, the employees are not willing to work; and though firms would 
be willing to promise to pay workers in the future for current work, such 
promises are not credible, given the informational imperfections. 
During the past ten years, a different strand of literature has focused on a 
different set of limitations on information and on contracting in the labor 
market as an explanation of wage rigidity and unemployment. This literature 
argues that for a variety of reasons (selection, incentive, morale, turnover) net 
productivity increases with wages, sufliciently so that it may not pay firms to 
lower their wage, even in the face of an excess supply of labor.21 These 
efficiency wage theories have been used to explain the existence of competi- 
tive market equilibria with unemployment. Some versions of the theory 
explain why wages may not change at all, in the face of a change in the 
demand for labor;22 while in other versions23 the real wage falls somewhat, 
but not enough to absorb the full impact of the variability in the demand 
for labor. Thus, in these models, the variability in the demand for labor 
arising from the capital market imperfections discussed in previous sections 
of this paper gives rise to variability in employment: the two theories are 
thus complementary.24 
Capital market imperfections interact with efficiency wage theory in two 
other ways. First, many of the efficiency wage arguments would be mitigated 
if workers had sufficient capital to post bonds, ensuring their performance; 
but capital market imperfections mean that unless they have inherited or 
saved sufficient capital, they cannot post an adequate bond. Indeed, in many 
instances the employment relationship itself arises from differential ownership 
of or access to capital.25 
Secondly, firms’ responses to changes in environment are affected by their 
attitudes towards risk; and the kinds of capital market imperfections on 
which we focused in previous sections induce risk averse behavior on the 
“See Yellen (1984) or Stiglitz (1987) for a survey of these models. 
*‘See Stiglitz (1985). 
‘?See Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). 
240ther versions of the efficiency wage theory give less clear cyclical predictions. Thus, in the 
selection version, if the reservation (self-employment) wage falls in a recession, the primary sector 
wage may fall more or less proportionately. 
Also, there has been some concern about the consistency of observed patterns of cyclical 
movements in productivity and wages with the effort-efficiency wage model. The threat of 
unemployment should presumably induce retained workers to work even harder in recessionary 
periods, yet productivity typically declines. As we have argued, however, in the primary sector 
workers have long-term relationships, and the incentive to work is provided by the long-term 
relationships, and the value of this is enhanced by some wage/employment smoothing. 
*‘That is, self-employment obviates many of the sources of the efficiency wage problem. 
B.C. Greenwald and J.E. Stiglitz, Imperfect information 455 
part of many firms. Thus, consider a disturbance to the economy; and 
assume that firms believe that, as a result of efficiency wage considerations, 
productivity depends on relative wages. There is still some uncertainty about 
the effect of the disturbance on their workers’ productivity, even were they to 
keep their relative wage fixed; but this uncertainty increases if they change 
the relative wage. They may believe that an increase (or decrease) in relative 
wages will increase profitability, but the increased uncertainty associated with 
such an action, combined with their risk aversion, induces them to keep 
wages fixed, thus precluding the kinds of responses which would facilitate the 
adjustment of the economy to the disturbance. 
Efficiency wage theory has been particularly successful in explaining the 
pattern and form of unemployment, in explaining why there should be 
differential unemployment rates among different groups, in explaining why 
changes in the demand for labor should have differential effects on different 
groups, and in explaining why a reduction in the demand for labor should 
take the form of lay-offs rather than work-sharing. It has not been able to 
explain why there should be fluctuations in the demand for labor (given that 
technology and capital stock seem to vary little in the short run). Our theory 
of capital market imperfections provides the missing link. For their part, 
efficiency wage thecries are capable of explaining unemployment in second- 
ary sectors of the economy and the existence of long-lived non-cyclical 
queues for primary sector jobs. Thus, they complete the full range of 
explanations of the various types of unemployment outlined in the introduc- 
tion to this paper. 
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